Page 545 - untitled

516 Dissenting Statement

2007. Th e only remaining motive—and the valid one—was the eff ect of the AH
goals imposed by HUD.
In 2008, aft er its takeover by the government, Fannie Mae fi nally published a
credit supplement to its 2008 10-K, which contained an accounting of its subprime
and Alt-A credit exposure. Th e table is reproduced below in order to provide a
picture of the kinds of loans Fannie acquired in order to meet the AH goals. Loans
may appear in more than one category, so the table does not reveal Fannie’s total
net exposure to each category, nor does it include Fannie’s holdings of non-Fannie
MBS or PMBS, for which it did not have loan level data. Note the reference to
$8.4 billion in the column for subprime loans. As noted earlier, Fannie classifi ed
as subprime only those loans that it purchased from subprime lenders. However,
Fannie included loans with FICO scores of less than 660 in the table, indicating that
they are not prime loans but without classifying them formally as subprime.
In a later credit supplement, fi led in August 2009, Fannie eliminated the
duplications among the loans in Table 12, and reported that as of June 30, 2009, it
held the credit risk on NTMs with a total unpaid principal amount of $2.7 trillion.
135
Th e average loan amount was $151,000, for a total of 5.73 million NTM loans.
Th is number does not include Fannie’s holdings of subprime PMBS as to which it
does not have loan level data.

135 http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/sec/2009/q2credit_summary.pdf, p.5.