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456                      Dissenting Statement


         under CRA—to reach deeper into subprime lending in order to fi nd the mortgages
         they needed to comply with their own government requirements. Th  is was also true
         of the mortgage banks—the largest of which was Countrywide—that were bound to
         promote aff ordable housing through HUD’s Best Practices Initiative.
              By 2008, the result of these government programs was an unprecedented
         number of subprime and other high risk mortgages in the U.S. fi nancial system. Table
         1 shows which agencies or fi rms were holding the credit risk of these mortgages-
         -or had distributed it to investors through mortgage-backed securities (MBS)--
         immediately before the fi nancial crisis began. As Table 1 makes clear, government
         agencies, or private institutions acting under government direction, either held or
         had guaranteed 19.2 million of the NTM loans that were outstanding at this point.
         By contrast, about 7.8 million NTMs had been distributed to investors through the
                                                         16
         issuance of private mortgage-backed securities, or PMBS,  primarily by private
         issuers such as Countrywide and other subprime lenders.
              Th  e fact that the credit risk of two-thirds of all the NTMs in the fi nancial
         system was held by the government or by entities acting under government control
         demonstrates the central role of the government’s policies in the development of
         the 1997-2007 housing bubble, the mortgage meltdown that occurred when the
         bubble defl ated, and the fi nancial crisis and recession that ensued. Similarly, the
         fact that only 7.8 million NTMs were held by investors and fi nancial institutions in
         the form of PMBS shows that this group of NTMs were less important as a cause of
         the fi nancial crisis than the government’s role. Th  e Commission majority’s report
         focuses almost entirely on the 7.8 million PMBS, and is thus an example of its
         determination to ignore the government’s role in the fi nancial crisis.
                                       Table 1. 17

                    Entity            No. of Subprime   Unpaid Principal Amount
                                      and Alt-A Loans
          Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac    12 million          $1.8 trillion
          FHA and other Federal*        5 million           $0.6 trillion
          CRA and HUD Programs          2.2 million         $0.3 trillion
          Total Federal Government     19.2 million         $2.7 trillion
          Other (including subprime and   7.8 million       $1.9 trillion
          Alt-A PMBS issued by Countrywide,
          Wall Street and others)
          Total                         27 million          $4.6 trillion
         *Includes Veterans Administration, Federal Home Loan Banks and others.
              To be sure, the government’s eff orts to increase home ownership through the
         AH goals succeeded. Home ownership rates in the U.S. increased from approximately
                                                                          18
         64 percent in 1994 (where it had been for 30 years) to over 69 percent in 2004.
         Almost everyone in and out of government was pleased with this—a long term goal
         16   In the process known as securitization, securities backed by a pool of mortgages (mortgage-
         backed securities, or MBS) and issued by private sector fi rms were known as private label securities
         (distinguishing them from securities issued by the GSEs or Ginnie Mae) or private MBS (PMBS).
         17   See Edward Pinto’s analysis in Exhibit 2 to the Triggers Memo, April 21, 2010, p.4. http://www.aei.org/
         docLib/Pinto-Sizing-Total-Federal-Contributions.pdf.
         18   Census Bureau data.
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