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Peter J. Wallison                    509


         September 2008. Th  e reason for this nearly reckless behavior is obvious—they were
         still subject to the AH goals, which were increasing through this period. If they had
         only acquired these NTMs to compete with Countrywide and others for market
         share the competition was already over; their competitors had abandoned the fi eld.
         But the fact is that Fannie did not—or could not—increase its market share between
         2004 and 2006 shows without question that market share was not the reason they
         had acquired so many NTMs by the time they failed in September 2008.
              Beleaguered by accounting problems, suff ering diminished profi tability, and
         lacking the capability to evaluate the risks of the new kinds of mortgages they would
         have to buy, Fannie had no option but to stay the course they had been following for
         15 years. Th  e NTMs they bought during the period from 2004 to 2007 were acquired
         to comply with the AH goals and not to increase their market share—as much as
         Fannie might have preferred to do so. Fannie’s market share fi nally did increase in
         2007, when the asset-backed market collapsed, Countrywide weakened, and neither
         Countrywide nor anyone else could continue to securitize mortgages. In a report
         to the board of directors on October 16, 2007, Mudd reported that Fannie’s market
         share, which was 20 percent of the whole market at the beginning of 2007, had risen
         to 42 percent. 113
              Th  at leaves one other possibility—that Fannie and Freddie were buying
         NTMs because they were profi table. Th  at issue is addressed in the next section.


         Did Fannie acquire NTMs because these loans were profi table?
              From time to time, commentators on the GSEs have suggested that the GSEs’
         real motive for acquiring NTMs was not that they had to comply with the AH
         goals, but that they were seeking the profi ts these risky loans produced. Th is could
         have been true in the 1990s, but aft er the major increase in the AH goals in 2000
         Fannie began to recognize that complying with the goals was reducing the fi rm’s
         profi tability. By 2007, Fannie was asking for relief from the goals.
              Th  e following table, drawn from a FHFA publication, shows the applicable
         AH goals over the period from 1996 through 2008 and the GSEs’ success in meeting
         them.






















         113   Fannie Mae, Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors, October 16, 2007, p.18.
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