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              FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT




         Subprime Mortgage Originations
         In 2006, $600 billion of subprime loans were originated, most of which were
         securitized. That year, subprime lending accounted for 23.5% of all mortgage
         originations.

         IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
                                                            23.5%
         $700
                        Subprime share of entire        22.7%
                                                   20.9%
                        mortgage market
          600
                        Securitized
          500           Non-securitized
                                               8.3%
          400
                   10.6%          10.1%
                             10.4%     7.6%  7.4%
          300
                                                                    9.2%
               9.5%      9.8%
          200
          100
                                                                        1.7%
            0
               ’96  ’97  ’98  ’99  ’00  ’01  ’02  ’03  ’04  ’05  ’06  ’07  ’08

         2007, securities issued exceeded originations.
         SOURCE: Inside Mortgage Finance


         Figure .



         more familiar with the securitization of these assets, mortgage specialists and Wall
         Street bankers got in on the action. Securitization and subprime originations grew
         hand in hand. As figure . shows, subprime originations increased from  billion
         in  to  billion in . The proportion securitized in the late s peaked at
         , and subprime mortgage originations’ share of all originations hovered around
         .
           Securitizations by the RTC and by Wall Street were similar to the Fannie and
         Freddie securitizations. The first step was to get principal and interest payments from
         a group of mortgages to flow into a single pool. But in “private-label” securities (that
         is, securitizations not done by Fannie or Freddie), the payments were then “tranched”
         in a way to protect some investors from losses. Investors in the tranches received dif-
         ferent streams of principal and interest in different orders.
           Most of the earliest private-label deals, in the late s and early s, used a
         rudimentary form of tranching. There were typically two tranches in each deal. The
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