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Notes to Chapter 18                   613



           83. Lockhart, interview.
           84. Edward DeMarco, interview by FCIC, March 18, 2010.
           85. Mudd, interview.
           86. Henry Cisneros, interview by FCIC, October 13, 2010.
           87. Mudd, testimony before the FCIC, April 9, 2010, transcript, p. 104.
           88. Robert Levin, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and
         Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3, session 1: Fannie Mae, April 9, 2010, transcript,
         p. 104.
                                      Chapter 18
           1. Joseph Sommer, counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, email to Patrick M. Parkinson, deputy
         research director, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, et al., “Re: another option we
         should present re triparty?” July 13, 2008.
           2. James Dimon, interview by FCIC, October 20, 2010.
           3. Barry Zubrow, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of
         Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 1, ses-
         sion 2: Lehman Brothers, September 1, 2010, p. 212.
           4. Richard S. Fuld Jr., testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact
         of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 1,
         session 2: Lehman Brothers, September 1, 2010, p. 148. See also Fuld’s written testimony at same hearing,
         p. 6.
           5. Ben Bernanke, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of
         Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 2, ses-
         sion 1: The Federal Reserve, September 2, 2010, transcript, pp. 26, 89.
           6. Kenneth D. Lewis, interview by FCIC, October 22, 2010.
           7. Bernanke, testimony before the FCIC, September 2, 2010, p. 22.
           8. Bernanke told the examiner that the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and “markets in general” viewed
         Lehman as the next most vulnerable investment bank because of its funding model. Anton R. Valukas,
         Report of Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors, Chapter 11 Case No. 08-13555
         (JMP), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), March 11, 2010, 2:631 (hereafter cited as Valukas); see also 1:5 and n. 16, 2:609
         and nn. 2133–34, 4:1417 and n. 5441, 4:1482 and n. 5728, 4:1494, and 5:1663 and n. 6269. Paulson, 2:632.
         Geithner told the examiner that following Bear Stearns’s near collapse, he considered Lehman to be the
         “most exposed” investment bank, 2:631; see also 1:5 and n. 16, 2:609, 4:1417 and n. 5441, 4:1482 and
         n. 5728, 4:1491 and n. 5769, and 5:1663 and n. 6269. Cox reported that after Bear Stearns collapsed,
         Lehman was the SEC’s “number one focus”; 1:5 and n. 16, and p. 1491 and n. 5769; see also 2:609, 631.
           9. Timothy Geithner, quoted in Valukas, 1:8 and n. 30, 4:1496.
           10. Donald L. Kohn, email to Bernanke, “Re: Lehman,” June 13, 2008. Valukas, 2:615; 2:609 and n.
         2134.
           11. Harvey R. Miller, bankruptcy counsel for Lehman Brothers, interview by FCIC, August 5, 2010;
         Lehman board minutes, September 14, 2008, p. 34.
           12. Erik R. Sirri, interview by FCIC, April 1, 2010.
           13. Paolo R. Tonucci, interview by FCIC, August 6, 2010.
           14. Specifically, Lehman drew $1.6 billion on March 18; $2.3 billion on March 19 and 20; $2.7 billion
         on March 24; $2.1 billion on March 25 and 26; and $2 billion on April 16. Lehman Brothers, “Presenta-
         tion to the Federal Reserve: Update on Capital, Leverage & Liquidity,” May 28, 2008, p. 15. See also
         Robert Azerad, vice president, Lehman Brothers, “2008 Q2—Liquidity Position (June 6, 2008),” p. 3. Af-
         ter its bankruptcy, Lehman drew $28 billion, $19.7 billion, and $20.4 billion, on September 15, 16, and
         17, until Barclays replaced the Fed in providing financing. Valukas, 4:1399. See also David Weisbrod,
         senior vice president, Treasury and Securities Services–Risk Management, JPMorgan Chase & Co., email
         to James Dimon et al., “Re: TriParty Close,” September 15, 2008.
           15. Thomas A. Russo, former vice chairman and chief legal officer, Lehman Brothers, email to
         Richard S. Fuld Jr., forwarding article by John Brinsley (originally sent to Russo by Robert Steel), “Paul-
         son Says Investment Banks Making Progress in Raising Funds,” Bloomberg, June 13, 2008 (quoting
         Robert Steel), June 13, 2008.
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