Page 196 - untitled
P. 196

ALL IN                                                        



         Rejected Loans Waived in by Selected Banks
         From January 2006 through June 2007, Clayton rejected 28% of the mortgages
         it reviewed. Of these, 39% were waived in anyway.

                             A         B           C         D         E
                          ACCEPTED   REJECTED   REJECTED  REJECTED   FINANCIAL
                           LOANS     LOANS       LOANS    LOANS AFTER  INSTITUTION
                         (Event 1 & 2)/  (Event 3)/  WAIVED IN BY   WAIVERS   WAIVER RATE
                          Total pool of   Total pool of   FINANCIAL   (B–C)  (C/B)
                            loans     loans    INSTITUTIONS
         Financial Institution
         Citigroup          58%      42%          13%       29%       31%
         Credit Suisse      68       32           11        21        33
         Deutsche           65       35           17        17        50
         Goldman            77       23            7        16        29
         JP Morgan          73       27           14        13        51
         Lehman             74       26           10        16        37
         Merrill            77       23            7        16        32
         UBS                80       20            6        13        33
         WaMu               73       27            8        19        29
         Total Bank Sample  72%      28%          11%       17%       39%
         NOTES:  From Clayton Trending Reports. Numbers may not add due to rounding.
         SOURCE: Clayton Holdings


         Figure .

         guidelines. “As you know, there was stated income, they were telling us look for rea-
                                           
         sonableness of that income, things like that.” With stricter guidelines, one would ex-
         pect more rejections, and, after the securitizer looks more closely at the rejected
         loans, possibly more waivers. As Moody’s Investors Service explained in a letter to
         the FCIC, “A high rate of waivers from an institution with extremely tight underwrit-
         ing standards could result in a pool that is less risky than a pool with no waivers from
                                                          
         an institution with extremely loose underwriting standards.” Nonetheless, many
         prospectuses indicated that the loans in the pools either met guidelines outright or
         had compensating factors, even though Clayton’s records show that only a portion of
         the loans were sampled, and that of those that were sampled, a substantial percentage
         of Grade  Event loans were waived in.
           Johnson said he approached the rating agencies in  and  to gauge their
         interest in the exception-tracking product that Clayton was developing. He said he
         shared some of their company’s results, attempting to convince the agencies that the
         data would benefit the ratings process. “We went to the rating agencies and said,
         ‘Wouldn’t this information be great for you to have as you assign tranche levels of
   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201