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                      F FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORTINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT

         CDOs created by Goldman Sachs.   Because of such deals, when the housing bubble
         burst, billions of dollars changed hands.
           Although Goldman executives agreed that synthetic CDOs were “bets” that mag-
         nified overall risk, they also maintained that their creation had “social utility” be-
         cause it added liquidity to the market and enabled investors to customize the
         exposures they wanted in their portfolios.   In testimony before the Commission,
         Goldman’s President and Chief Operating Officer Gary Cohn argued: “This is no dif-
         ferent than the tens of thousands of swaps written every day on the U.S. dollar versus
         another currency. Or, more importantly, on U.S. Treasuries . . . This is the way that
         the financial markets work.” 
           Others, however, criticized these deals. Patrick Parkinson, the current director of
         the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation at the Federal Reserve Board,
         noted that synthetic CDOs “multiplied the effects of the collapse in subprime.” 
         Other observers were even harsher in their assessment. “I don’t think they have social
         value,” Michael Greenberger, a professor at the University of Maryland School of Law
         and former director of the Division of Trading and Markets at the Commodity Fu-
         tures Trading Commission, told the FCIC. He characterized the credit default swap
         market as a “casino.” And he testified that “the concept of lawful betting of billions of
         dollars on the question of whether a homeowner would default on a mortgage that
         was not owned by either party, has had a profound effect on the American public and
         taxpayers.” 


                    MOODY’S: “ACHIEVED THROUGH SOME ALCHEMY”
         The machine churning out CDOs would not have worked without the stamp of ap-
         proval given to these deals by the three leading rating agencies: Moody’s, S&P, and
         Fitch. Investors often relied on the rating agencies’ views rather than conduct their
         own credit analysis. Moody’s was paid according to the size of each deal, with caps set
         at a half-million dollars for a “standard” CDO in  and  and as much as
         , for a “complex” CDO. 
           In rating both synthetic and cash CDOs, Moody’s faced two key challenges: first,
         estimating the probability of default for the mortgage-backed securities purchased by
         the CDO (or its synthetic equivalent) and, second, gauging the correlation between
         those defaults—that is, the likelihood that the securities would default at the same
         time.   Imagine flipping a coin to see how many times it comes up heads. Each flip is
         unrelated to the others; that is, the flips are uncorrelated. Now, imagine a loaf of
         sliced bread. When there is one moldy slice, there are likely other moldy slices. The
         freshness of each slice is highly correlated with that of the other slices. As investors
         now understand, the mortgage-backed securities in CDOs were less like coins than
         like slices of bread.
           To estimate the probability of default, Moody’s relied almost exclusively on its
         own ratings of the mortgage-backed securities purchased by the CDOs.   At no time
         did the agencies “look through” the securities to the underlying subprime mortgages.
         “We took the rating that had already been assigned by the [mortgage-backed securi-
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