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             FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT


         were downgraded and by , all the tranches had been downgraded. Of all mort-
         gage-backed securities it had rated triple-A in , Moody’s downgraded  to
         junk.   The consequences would reverberate throughout the financial system.


                           FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC:
                      “LESS COMPETITIVE IN THE MARKETPLACE”
         In , Fannie and Freddie faced problems on multiple fronts. They had violated ac-
         counting rules and now faced corrections and fines.   They were losing market share
         to Wall Street, which was beginning to dominate the securitization market. Strug-
         gling to remain dominant, they loosened their underwriting standards, purchasing
         and guaranteeing riskier loans, and increasing their securities purchases.   Yet their
         regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), focused
         more on accounting and other operational issues than on Fannie’s and Freddie’s in-
         creasing investments in risky mortgages and securities.
           In , Freddie changed accounting firms. The company had been using Arthur
         Andersen for many years, but when Andersen got into trouble in the Enron debacle
         (which put both Enron and its accountant out of business), Freddie switched to
         PricewaterhouseCoopers. The new accountant found the company had understated
         its earnings by  billion from  through the third quarter of , in an effort to
         smooth reported earnings and promote itself as “Steady Freddie,” a company of
         strong and steady growth. Bonuses were tied to the reported earnings, and OFHEO
         found that this arrangement contributed to the accounting manipulations. Freddie’s
         board ousted most top managers, including Chairman and CEO Leland Brendsel,
         President and COO David Glenn, and CFO Vaughn Clarke.   In December ,
         Freddie agreed with OFHEO to pay a  million penalty and correct governance,
         internal controls, accounting, and risk management. In January , OFHEO di-
         rected Freddie to maintain  more than its minimum capital requirement until it
         reduced operational risk and could produce timely, certified financial statements.
         Freddie Mac would settle shareholder lawsuits for  million and pay  million
         in penalties to the SEC.
           Fannie was next. In September , OFHEO discovered violations of accounting
         rules that called into question previous filings. In , OFHEO reported that Fannie
         had overstated earnings from  through  by  billion and that it, too, had
         manipulated accounting in ways influenced by compensation plans.   OFHEO made
         Fannie improve accounting controls, maintain the same  capital surplus imposed
         on Freddie, and improve governance and internal controls. Fannie’s board ousted
         CEO Franklin Raines and others, and the SEC required Fannie to restate its results
         for  through mid-. Fannie settled SEC and OFHEO enforcement actions for
          million in penalties. Donald Bisenius, an executive vice president at Freddie
         Mac, told the FCIC that the accounting issues distracted management from the
         mortgage business, taking “a tremendous amount of management’s time and atten-
         tion and probably led to us being less aggressive or less competitive in the market-
         place [than] we otherwise might have been.” 
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