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BEFORE OUR VERY EYES                                             


           The OCC was also pondering the situation. Former comptroller of the currency
         John C. Dugan told the Commission that the push had come from below, from bank
         examiners who had become concerned about what they were seeing in the field. 
           The agency began to consider issuing “guidance,” a kind of nonbinding official
         warning to banks, that nontraditional loans could jeopardize safety and soundness
         and would invite scrutiny by bank examiners. Siddique said the OCC led the effort,
         which became a multiagency initiative. 
           Bies said that deliberations over the potential guidance also stirred debate within
         the Fed, because some critics feared it both would stifle the financial innovation that
         was bringing record profits to Wall Street and the banks and would make homes less
         affordable. Moreover, all the agencies—the Fed, the OCC, the OTS, the FDIC, and
         the National Credit Union Administration—would need to work together on it, or it
         would unfairly block one group of lenders from issuing types of loans that were avail-
         able from other lenders. The American Bankers Association and Mortgage Bankers
         Association opposed it as regulatory overreach.
           “The bankers pushed back,” Bies told the Commission. “The members of Con-
         gress pushed back. Some of our internal people at the Fed pushed back.” 
           The Mortgage Insurance Companies of America, which represents mortgage in-
         surance companies, weighed in on the other side. “We are deeply concerned about
         the contagion effect from poorly underwritten or unsuitable mortgages and home
         equity loans,” the trade association wrote to regulators in . “The most recent
         market trends show alarming signs of undue risk-taking that puts both lenders and
         consumers at risk.” 
           In congressional testimony about a month later, William A. Simpson, the group’s
         vice president, pointedly referred to past real estate downturns. “We take a conserva-
         tive position on risk because of our first loss position,” Simpson informed the Senate
         Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation and Community Development and the
         Senate Subcommittee on Economic Policy. “However, we also have a historical per-
         spective. We were there when the mortgage markets turned sharply down during the
         mid-s especially in the oil patch and the early s in California and the
         Northeast.” 
           Within the Fed, the debate grew heated and emotional, Siddique recalled. “It got
         very personal,” he told the Commission. The ideological turf war lasted more than a
         year, while the number of nontraditional loans kept growing and growing. 
           Consumer advocates kept up the heat. In a Fed Consumer Advisory Council
         meeting in March , Fed Governors Bernanke, Mark Olson, and Kevin Warsh
         were specifically and publicly warned of dangers that nontraditional loans posed to
         the economy. Stella Adams, the executive director of the North Carolina Fair Hous-
         ing Center, raised concerns that nontraditional lending “may precipitate a downward
         spiral that starts on the coast and then creates panic in the east that could have impli-
         cations on our total economy as well.” 
           At the next meeting of the Fed’s Consumer Advisory Council, held in June 
         and attended by Bernanke, Bies, Olson, and Warsh, several consumer advocates de-
         scribed to the Fed governors alarming incidents that were now occurring all over the
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